Cognitive Underpinnings and Attitude Strength-Related Beliefs



Researchers have long understood that attitudes vary in strength. Some attitudes are enduring and consequential, whereas others are not. Researchers have thus been very interested in identifying properties of attitudes which are characteristic of strength. One widely used class of these properties is beliefs about the attitude (e.g., certainty, ambivalence). Beliefs about attitude strength are judgments people make about the nature of an attitude. These beliefs are known to be related to attitude strength outcomes and they have been used to predict an attitude’s persistence and resistance to persuasion, as well as its effect on information processing and behaviour. For example, people who are more certain about their attitudes on a particular topic are more likely to behave in an attitude-consistent manner. Although the relationships between attitude strength properties have been examined in many studies, it is unclear how people arrive at judgments about their attitudes. That is, what are the determinants of attitude strength-related beliefs and what are the processes through which they are formed? It may be that when asked to make judgments about their attitudes, people may try to infer their beliefs from the existing structural nature of their attitudes. Our research (Fabrigar, Petty, Smith & Crites, 2006) shows that people reflect on the amount of knowledge their attitude is based on when they provide judgments of attitude strength. In addition, people reflect on how much they have thought about attitude-relevant information they have encountered as an indicator of how strong their attitude is. Further, the consistency of the information base is particularly relevant (see, e.g.,  MacDougall et al. 2002)



My research has the goal of further understanding how the underlying cognitive structure and processes through which attitudes are formed affects judgments of attitude strength. In my initial studies, I have focused on creating novel attitudes, which allows the direct manipulation of structural features of attitudes in order to determine their effect on strength related beliefs. Results have indicated that some strength-related beliefs are sensitive to changes in a wide range of structural and processing variables, whereas other beliefs are affected by a more restricted set. For example, the certainty with which an attitude is held is influenced by the amount of knowledge the attitude is based on, the consistency of that knowledge, and the degree to which the knowledge is elaborated. As knowledge, consistency, and elaboration increase, so does attitude certainty. Ambivalence, on the other hand, is affected by a more restricted set of variables. Indeed, in the studies I have conducted, only the consistency of the knowledge base has influenced ambivalence - as consistency increased, ambivalence decreased (see Smith, Fabrigar, Wiesenthal, & MacDougall, in press).



          In future work, I intend to continue investigating the role of structural features of attitudes, and the processes through which attitudes are formed, on strength related beliefs. As we begin to understand what variables affect judgments of strength related beliefs, we can begin to understand how different strength-related beliefs are similar and different. Some strength-related beliefs probably affected by a wide range of variables (e.g., certainty, perceived knowledge), whereas others are likely affected by only a few variables (e.g., involvement, ambivalence). Understanding how these strength properties are similar and distinct may allow us to develop classifications of properties of attitude strength that are conceptually related. In addition, we are conducting a series of studies to develop psychometrically sound measures of attitude strength beliefs in order to help in the understanding of the nature and consequences of these beliefs.

 

Attitude Structure and Attitude-Behaviour/Decision Consistency



          In a second line of inquiry involving attitude theory, I am examining how structural properties of attitudes affect attitude-behaviour and decision consistency. My immediate research has the goal of better understanding the mechanisms through which working knowledge influences attitude-behaviour and attitude-decision consistency. I am proposing a new process through which working knowledge may affect attitude-decision consistency. I have hypothesized that the key feature is the complexity of the attitude (i.e., the number of distinct dimensions of knowledge that the particular attitude is based on).  It is highly likely that there are some attitudes that are relatively simple, based on few distinct dimensions of information, and some that are very complex, based on multiple dimensions. I am suggesting that working knowledge may affect attitude-decision consistency through the degree of match between the nature of the attitude and the nature of the decision. Imagine the case where a person has to decide which department store in which to purchase a tie. When confronted with a decision to make, a person may decide the degree to which the attitude is informative to the decision to be made. When the dimension is relevant, the attitude is a useful guide and attitude-decision consistency is high. For example, the person might have a strong evaluation of the department store based on knowledge of the men's wear department. Thus the attitude would be relevant to the decision of where to buy a tie, and consistency between attitudes and behaviour would be high. However, if the person’s attitude toward the store was based on knowledge of the electronics department, the attitude would be less relevant to the decision of where to buy a tie, and consistency would be low. If this is the case, as knowledge increases, the number of dimensions likely increases, and the likelihood of there being a match between the nature of the attitude and the nature of the decision also increases, resulting in greater attitude-decision consistency. In addition, high knowledge attitudes may predict irrelevant decisions as well, because they may afford individuals more confidence in extrapolating to unrelated bases. If something is good on several known dimensions, it is probably good on a new dimension.



          In my initial studies, I have created attitudes toward novel objects and manipulated the amount and complexity of knowledge the attitude is based on. I have generally found that when the bases of attitudes are simple and match the nature of the decision to be made, attitudes predict decisions very well. However attitudes do not predict decisions well when the nature of the attitudes do not match the nature of the decision. When the basis of the attitude is complex, attitude predicts decisions well regardless of whether the nature of the attitude matches the nature of the decision (see Smith, Fabrigar, Petty, & Crites, 1999; 2000; Fabrigar, Petty, Smith & Crites, in press, JPSP). In future research, I intend to look at more complex behaviours, to see if these matching effects will replicate in those situations. I also intend to examine if these matching effects will generalize to different structural features of attitudes such as affective, cognitive, and functional bases. In addition, these studies have the potential for many applied implications. For example, there are many settings where attitudes and behaviour do not correspond. For example most young adults have very positive attitudes toward condom use, but this attitude does not always translate into action at the time of the behavioural decision. Understanding the nature of attitudes and decisions may increase our understanding of when attitudes will predict behaviours in these conditions.